Over the past decade, one of the most important developments in the corporate loan market has been the increasing participation of institutional investors in lending syndicates. As lenders, institutional investors routinely receive private information about borrowers. However, most of these investors also trade in public securities. This leads to a controversial question: do institutional investors use private information received in the loan market to trade in public securities? In this paper we examine the stock trading of institutional investors that also hold loans in their portfolio. Specifically, we look at the abnormal returns on stock trades following loan renegotiations. By collecting SEC filings of loan amendments, we are able to identify institutional investors that had access to private information disclosed by the borrower during loan renegotiations. Our results indicate that institutional managers that participate in loan renegotiations consequently trade in stock of the same company and outperform other managers by approximately 8.8% in annualized terms in the month following loan renegotiation. There is no doubt that institutional investors have access to fundamental nonpublic information in the loan market. Yet doubt remains on whether these institutions are effective at keeping the non-public information disclosed by the borrower to its lenders from influencing their investments in public securities. Formally, public securities can not be traded on the basis of material non-public information, i.e., private information that is likely to substantially affect the stock price. In practice, large institutional investors create "ethical walls" by adopting preemptive paper procedures meant to preclude trading on private information received from the loan markets. These "ethical walls" are a softer version of what came to be known as "Chinese walls" between investment and commercial banking which are typically associated with physical and functional separation within a bank, as well as formal wall-crossing procedures.
that includes all of the lenders, where the borrower explains its financial conditions and reasons for renegotiation. 3 There is no doubt that institutional investors have access to fundamental nonpublic information in the loan market. Yet doubt remains on whether these institutions are effective at keeping the non-public information disclosed by the borrower to its lenders from influencing their investments in public securities. Formally, public securities can not be traded on the basis of material non-public information, i.e., private information that is likely to substantially affect the stock price. In practice, large institutional investors create "ethical walls" by adopting preemptive paper procedures meant to preclude trading on private information received from the loan markets. These "ethical walls" are a softer version of what came to be known as "Chinese walls" between investment and commercial banking which are typically associated with physical and functional separation within a bank, as well as formal wall-crossing procedures.
In this paper, we look at the stock performance of the institutional managers that invest in the syndicated loan market and the stock market. We first document that stock portfolios of the institutional managers that invest in both markets outperform those of the investors that specialize in the stock market. In particular, we find that equity portfolio of the institutions that invest in the stock and loan of the same company outperform comparable investors that do not invest in the loan market by approximately 0.98% per year. We believe that this difference in performance is related to the use of information received in the loan market to trade in the stock market.
To establish a causal relation between private information release in the loan market and stock trading, we focus on the loan renegotiations that resulted in change of the loan spread. Renegotiations affecting the interest rate are likely to be associated with disclosure of private material information about the borrower. In addition, a typical loan contract would require a unanimous agreement from all lenders for a change of interest rate to take place. We then search SEC filings and news releases to assure that information disclosed to the lenders was not available to the public until several days later. Also from SEC filings, we are able to collect the names of the institutional investors that were part of the loan renegotiations and, thus, had access to the information disclosed by the borrower. With the exact time of the event and the identity of the lenders, we proceed to look at the returns on the stock trades following loan renegotiations. We find that managers with the loan holdings on average realize a 10.5% annualized abnormal return on their trades in stocks of the companies with loan renegotiations. 4 To assure that performance on these trades is not specific to a given stock or manager's unobservable characteristic, we compare abnormal returns on trades (i) across the managers for the same stock and (ii) across the stocks for the same manager. In the first case, we look at the stocks of the companies that had loan renegotiation, and compare returns on trades of the institutions that were part of the loan renegotiation against institutions that were not part of the loan renegotiation. In the second case, we look at all trades of the institutions that were part of the loan renegotiation and compare returns on stocks of the companies with loan renegotiation against the rest of their stock portfolio. In summary, we find that investors that take part in the loan renegotiations consequently trade on information disclosed in the loan market and outperform their 4 The returns are measured over one month following loan renegotiation.
comparison group by approximately 8.8% in annualized terms in the month following loan renegotiation.
In addition, we find that institutional investors holding loans in their portfolio also perform better on trades in stocks that are indirectly related to loan renegotiation, that is, companies that have high earnings correlation, high returns correlation, or are in the same industry as the company that renegotiated its loan. While less obvious, trading in related stock is actually a complex and important legal question. 5 However, the economic magnitude of the outperformance for the related stocks is small.
In what follows, we will focus on the economic evidence supporting use of nonpublic information received by received in the loan market for trading in stocks. We believe that regulatory implications should not be drawn without understanding the full scope of impact of institutional investment in the loan market. For instance, restricting institutional investors' access to private information would severely aggravate the agency within the lending syndicate and increase the cost of corporate lending. 6 This is the first paper that looks directly at the institutional managers' investment in the loan market and, more broadly, across different security classes. However, there is important and growing literature that investigates cross-market information flow. Thus, our findings contribute to those of Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002), Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis (2003) , Blanco, Brennan and Marsh (2005) , Altman, Saunders and Gande (2005) and Acharya and Johnson (2005) . This paper also helps understand the exact channel of information transmission between the loan and equity market and, in that sense, adds to the findings by Massa and Rehman (2005) . Broadly speaking, the unique feature of our 5 See Allen, Kraakman and Subramanian (2007) . 6 Ivashina (2006) finds that information asymmetries within a lending syndicate lead to large economic costs for the borrower. paper is that we are able to identify the time when private information is released by the borrower and the identity of the investors that have access to private information. This allows us to address causality in a direct way.
The remainder of the paper is divided into four sections. In the first section, we provide more details on institutional background and discuss our sample construction. In the second section, we look at the aggregate performance of stock portfolios for institutional investors who participate in both stock and loan markets. In section three, we establish causality of information flow between loan and stock markets by following equity trading following loan renegotiations. In section four, we summarize our conclusions.
I. Institutional Background and Sample Construction

A. Institutional environment
The banking industry considers syndicated lending to be the largest and most profitable corporate financing business. 7 New corporate issuance of syndicated loans is estimated to be at least twice as large as total bond issuance and over five times larger than equity issuance. The essence of syndicated lending is that instead of one lender there is a group of lenders, or lending syndicate, that funds loan under the same loan agreement. 8 An increasing trend in this major financial market is that most of the participants in the lending syndicates are not banks but institutional investors, including insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds and hedge funds. Table I shows that institutional presence in the primary loan market goes back at least to the early 90s. The dynamic of the market was significantly affected by the standardization process and improvements in liquidity that took place in the mid-90s. This structural change is likely to explain the increase in the number of institutional loan holdings toward the end of the sample.
II. Aggregate stock portfolio performance
We start our analysis by looking at the overall performance of the stock portfolio of the institutional managers that also invest in the loan market. Specifically, we want to see if there are differences in aggregate performance for institutional managers that invest in the loan market (Stock & Loan) as compared to similar investors that do not invest in the loan market (Stock only). Therefore, each investor in our sample is matched to a control group.
For mutual funds, we used CRSP mutual fund data to identify comparable funds. Portfolio performance is risk-adjusted and it is calculated using the Grinblatt and Titman (1993) approximation (GT). The measure calculates the sum of time series covariance between portfolio weight change and returns of each asset included in the evaluating portfolio. In particular, the GT measure uses a four-quarter change in portfolio weights and multiplies it by the future return. For example, the performance from quarter t to t+m is calculated as: 
∑∑
, where w j,t is the weight of stock j in an institutional investor's portfolio at quarter t, and R j,t+i is stock i's return from (t+i-1) to (t+i). The GT measure does not require any benchmark portfolio, yet it has been shown to effectively adjust for the risk of the underlying portfolio.
In Panel B of Table II , we compare differences in performance for two groups of the stock and loan investors: those that hold stock and loan of the same company and those that hold stock and loan of different companies. Because the sample of the stock and loan investors is not big enough to construct a proper benchmark, we look at the differences in performance with respect to style and size matched stock-only investors.
We also use multivariate framework which allows us to control for the size of the investors. We find that, between 1990 and 2005, investors that hold stock and loan of the same company outperform other institutions that invest across stock and loan markets by 0.86% per year.
We believe that the difference in performance for the investors that hold stock and loan of the same company could be attributed to the use of non-public information from the loan market to trade in the stock market. Evidently, the private information effect may not be the only possible explanation for the aggregate outperformance. Other potential explanations could be endogeneity of the investment choices (i.e., factors that drive the decision to combine stock and loan for a given company), or portfolio manager's skill.
Although we control for the skill effect using control sample matched by size and style, these factors may still be too rough to account for all the skill variation between institutional investors. In what follows, we focus on loan renegotiation and provide direct evidence that institutional investors use non-public information gathered in the loan market to trade in stock.
III. Stock portfolio rebalancing following loan renegotiations
A. Loan amendments sample
To understand causality of the information flow between the loan and equity markets, we look at the stock trades following loan renegotiations. Loan renegotiations are very frequent and can be triggered by covenants violations, changes in market conditions, or a company's financing needs. 14 Some loan amendments can be approved by majority vote of the lenders; however, changes in the credit agreement concerning repayment schedule, maturity, loan amount, or interest rate typically require the consent of all lenders. In practical terms, this means that when a borrower needs to renegotiate terms of the loan, it will do it by holding a private conference call for all of its lenders. Such loan renegotiations, therefore, represent exogenous events when institutional managers receive private information in the loan market.
Amendments to the credit agreements are typically disclosed by the borrower as part of its 8-K, 10-Q and 10-K SEC filings, from which DealScan collects dates of the renegotiations and changes in loan contracts. We focus on the loan amendments that result in interest rate changes. 15 To ensure that private information disclosed by the borrower was new, we only look at the first change in the interest rates. Because loan amendments that change interest rates require a unanimous agreement of all the lenders, we assure that we can credibly identify all the investors that received information from the borrower. In addition, loan amendments language tends to be very technical, and we rarely found companies explaining in their reports to the shareholders the reason for credit amendments. 16 Thus, by focusing on the loan renegotiations that resulted in interest rate changes, we identify those cases where it is likely that the borrower disclosed material non-public information.
Loan amendment data is very scarce before 1998; so we look at the loan renegotiations that took place between 1998 and 2005. For this period, in DealScan we find a total of 169 loan amendments that corresponds to the first interest rate change for the publicly traded U.S. companies with at least one institutional investor in the original lending syndicate. For 169 cases, we search for the original SEC filing. The reason for collecting SEC reports is twofold. First, we want to assure that information disclosed during renegotiation, or even the fact that loan renegotiation took place, did not become public until several days later. Second, loan amendments have to be signed by all lending syndicate members at the day of the amendment's ratification. By looking at the actual filings, we were able to verify that the institutional investors that were part of the original loan syndicate did not sell their position on the secondary loan market and had access to private information about the borrower.
[TABLE III]
Table III summarizes results of collecting loan amendments from SEC filings.
Out of 169 amendments mentioned in DealScan, we are able to get detailed information for 160 cases. This reflects that loan amendment data collected by DealScan is actually quite accurate. We find that amendments to loan contracts were disclosed on average 16 Typically, an SEC filing would disclose an actual loan amendment but would not explain why the amendment took place. In its Quarterly Report filed on May 17, 1999, the following description of the Integrated Health Services loan renegotiation from March 25, 1999 is one of the most detailed that we could find: "In March 1999, the Company amended its Credit Facility, whose amendments loosened the financial covenants, increased interest rates, and accelerated the reduction in the availability under the Credit Facility." about 39 days after the renegotiation took place. 17 We also search public news releases and find that, in 62 cases, loan amendments were mentioned in the news before the SEC filing. Overall, however, in only 15 out of 160 cases did the information about loan amendments become public the same day that renegotiation took place. We exclude these cases from our sample and match the identity of the investors with institutions in CDA/Spectrum. Our final sample contains 110 renegotiations; on average, we are able to match 5 managers per loan amendment. In 32 out of 110 loan amendments, we observe managers that hold stocks and loans of the same company in their portfolio.
In Panel B of the Table III , we compare the structure of the lending syndicate at the origination and the lending syndicate at the moment of renegotiation. The average time to renegotiation in our sample is approximately 18 months. Interestingly, the number of the members in the syndicate remains relatively constant; however, the identities of the participants change. We do not observe the share of the loan held by each member of the syndicate; however, it appears that the lead banks do not sell their loan holding, while approximately half of the participants change by the time of the renegotiation.
In the appendix we look at the returns behavior surrounding the date of the amendment. We do not find a statistically significant price reaction on the date of the amendment or on the date of the public disclosure in the loan or in the stock market. It is very difficult to determine if private information disclosed during the process of the renegotiation was fundamentally good or bad, as most often loan amendments represent simultaneous changes in multiple financial covenants, repayment terms, and pricing 17 All information disclosures by public companies must comply with the SEC Regulation Fair Disclosure (Regulation FD). Regulation FD requires immediate public release of all information where "it is reasonably foreseeable" that the information will be used to trade in a public market. Regulation FD does not explicitly exclude information exchange between borrowers and lenders. However, it would be exempt, because a typical loan would include a confidentiality agreement between lenders and borrowers.
schedules that tie borrower's performances to the interest rate. Thus, it is likely that mixing good and bad news affects the statistical significance of the results.
B. Abnormal returns following loan renegotiations
We do not know the nature of the information disclosed in loan renegotiations, and we do not observe full composition of the investors' portfolios (bonds or short positions). In that sense, we can not clearly anticipate if the investors sell or buy the stocks. Therefore, we look at the abnormal returns realized on the trades of the institutional investors following loan renegotiation. That is, we look at average AR x
Trade direction. Our hypothesis is that managers who invest in the loan market profit from trading stocks based on private information. CDA/Spectrum stock holdings data is quarterly; thus, in the quarter of the loan amendment, we look at the changes in the stock holdings for managers that were part of the loan renegotiation in the stock that was affected by the loan renegotiation. We then look at the abnormal returns realized on these trades. We expect that institutions with access to private information sell stocks that go down and buy stocks that go up. We assume that stock trades take place immediately after the loan amendment, and we look at the abnormal return realized over the following month.
[TABLE IV & V]
Table IV indicates that, institutions with access to private information in the loan market realize, on average, a 10.54% abnormal return on the trades in the stock of the borrower. This corresponds to the annualized return measure within the month following loan renegotiation. This result is statistically significant and robust to different calculations of abnormal returns, as well as alternative definitions of the trade direction.
The returns on the buy and sell positions are 18.38% and 2.25%, respectively.
There is a concern that stock trading could be attributed to a release of other public information within the same quarter, or to window-dressing practice. 18 To assure that rebalancing in a stock portfolio is caused by private information received by the institutional investors during loan renegotiation, for each manager we constructed a control sample, following trading in the same stock, in the same quarter, by comparable managers who do not have access to the information from the loan market. We select comparable managers within the same size quintile. The abnormal return on the trades by the investors, that were not part of the renegotiations, in the stocks affected by the loan renegotiations, is 1.71%, but not statistically different from zero. Therefore, institutional investors receiving non-public information from the borrower, trade in the stock of the borrower, and, on those trades, outperform on average investors without access to the loan market information by 8.83%, measured within the month following loan renegotiation. This result is significant and robust to alternative specifications.
We only observe stock holdings at the end of the quarter; this can be problematic if loan amendments take place and are disclosed to the public within the same quarter.
Because we know when information was released to the lenders and when it was released to the public, we are able to isolate those loan amendments where the information did not become public until the next quarter. This allows us to ensure that the marginal effect is, indeed, attributed to trades on private, rather than public, information. Throughout the paper, we report results for the full sample and the sample where loan information becomes public in a different quarter. The results are qualitatively similar for the two samples.
In Table V , we provide additional evidence that the earlier result is attributed to trading on private information, by restricting the control sample of the managers only to those institutions that invest in the loan market. We allow for the control sample to include those investors holding stock and loan of other borrowers. This way, we are certain to guarantee that this result is not specific to the group of institutional managers that invest in the loans in general, but only to those institutions that were part of the loan renegotiations. The result remains statistically and economically significant.
[TABLES VI & VII]
We want to assure that the results of superior performance are explained by the non-public information released in the process of the loan amendments, and not by a general characteristic of the stocks picked by the managers that invest in the stock and loan markets. To do that, we focus on the informed investors (investors that were part of the loan renegotiations), and compare performance of their trades in the stock of the borrower affected by the loan renegotiation against average performance on other stocks in their portfolio. Table VI summarizes those results. We find that, in the month following loan renegotiation, performance of the informed investors on the stocks without loan renegotiations is economically small and statistically insignificant. Informed investors' trades in the stock of the borrower with loan renegotiation outperform trades on other stocks in their portfolio by 10.26%, measured over the month following loan renegotiation.
As in Table VI, in Table VII we also look only at the informed investor, but instead of comparing trades in the stocks with loan renegotiation to all other stocks in the investor's portfolio, we restrict the control sample to the companies that have loans outstanding. The results reported in Table VI remain practically unchanged. Therefore, the documented outperformance only takes place following loan renegotiations, and it can not be explained by a broad stock or firm characteristic.
[TABLE VIII]
In the previous result, we first looked at the differences in trades for the same stock across different investors, and then we look at the differences in trades for the same investor across different stocks. What we did is a partial version of the difference-indifferences approach. In Table VIII , we report the full version estimation. Thus, access to private information is the treatment in our model, and we are interested in its effect on the trade. 19 The two levels of differences that we are looking at are: stocks with (R) and without (NR) loan amendments, and institutional investors that were part of the renegotiation (P), and investors that were not part of the renegotiation (NP). Our central hypothesis is about marginal abnormal returns realized on trades on non-public information received in the loan market, and it is equal to:
In the regressions, this effect is reflected in the coefficient on the interaction term between dummy identifying institutions with private information (Stock & Loan Investors) and dummy identifying stocks with loan renegotiations. Results in the Table   VIII indicate that approximately 9.13% of the outperformance by the investors that have 19 Given trade is a flow variable, formally, we are dealing with triple differences.
access to loan renegotiations is attributed to trading on information coming from the loan market.
[TABLE IX]
To better understand the economic value of our findings, in table IX we look at the size of the trades for the institutions that participate in the loan renegotiations in the stock of the borrower. Using absolute value of the change in number of shares held, we find that in the quarter of the loan renegotiation, investors change their holdings of the stock of the borrower by approximately 29%. This is three times larger than the change in the holdings of the same stock in the quarter previous to the loan renegotiation. Trades on the sell side tend to be twice as large (in relative value) as trades on the buy side. In general, portfolio weights in the stock of the borrower tend to be above the median portfolio weight.
C. Abnormal returns following loan renegotiations [TABLE X]
Thus far, we have found that, following loan amendments, institutional investors profit from trading in the same stock. However, cases where managers hold stocks and loans of the same company are relatively limited. In Table X , we test if institutional investors use private information disclosed in the loan market to infer information and trade in related stocks. Private fundamental information about a given company may be relevant to an investor from a portfolio perspective. For instance, if company A is considering an acquisition, there could be fundamental implications for other companies directly or indirectly related to company A.
We assume that information about company A is more relevant for company B if:
(i) absolute earnings correlation is higher; (ii) absolute stock returns correlation is higher; and (iii) companies A and B are in the same industry. These hypotheses correspond to the three different specifications reported in Table X . Although the economic result is comparatively small, we find statistically significant evidence that institutions with access to private information also profit from trading in the related stocks.
To ensure that the results of our analysis are robust to outliers or possible nonlinear features in the data, we also evaluate the performance of institutional investors who have access to loan amendment information using traditional sorting techniques. In particular, we focus on stocks traded by these institutional investors during the quarter of a loan amendment. For each quarter in which there was an amendment to a loan held by a manager, we first sort his stocks into quintiles according to how much each company in his portfolio is correlated with the loan amendment firm. If a manager holds more than one amended loan during the quarter, we use the maximum absolute correlation between each company and all loan amendment firms. To measure correlation, we again use both earnings correlation and return correlation. The correlation measures reflect how informative the loan renegotiation news is to the institutional manager. In the next step, we sub-sort stocks within each correlation quintile into three groups based on the institutional investor trading volume and direction, proxied by signed trading volume. For each institutional manager with loan amendment information, we thus end up with 15 sub-groups. We then follow the performance of the stocks over a quarter following the loan amendment dates.
[ It is interesting to observe that the difference in trading performance between high and low correlation groups is mainly driven by losing stocks. For stocks heavily sold by managers, the future return is 3.22% lower if they belong to the high correlation group vs.
if they belong to the low correlation group. This may be due to the fact that majority of the loan amendments in our sample are associated with increases in interest rate, which may reflect bad news to the loan issuing companies.
IV. Conclusions
Institutional investment in syndicated loans is probably the fastest expanding yet the least understood development in the corporate loan market. In this paper, we provide a first insight into why institutional investors choose to participate in the loan market, and how the news received in the loan market propagates through institutional managers' investments and into the equity market.
We look at the institutional investors that invest in equity and loan markets. We find that stock investments of the managers that hold stock and loan of the same company generally outperform stock investments of comparable managers that only hold stock, or invest in stock and loans of different companies. To verify the causal relation between superior information and outperformance, we introduce a direct test that looks at the institutional investors' trading behavior following loan renegotiations. We collect loan renegotiations data directly from the SEC filings and follow each amendment in the news to credibly identify the timing of the public information release. Our results indicate that when a loan contract is subject to a loan amendment, institutions holding the loan of the borrower realize large positive abnormal returns in the equity market by trading in the stock of the company with both the loan amendment as well as related stocks. In Panel A, Trade direction is equal to -1, 0, or 1 if, over the past quarter, the investor reduced, did not change, or increased his position in a given stock (i.e., the returns are counted only if the stock was traded). In Panel B, Trade direction is equal to -1 if, over the past quarter, the investor reduced his position in a given stock and, otherwise, it is equal to 1. To account for quarterly reporting of institutional stock holdings, the last four columns report results for the sub-sample restricted to those cases where the information about renegotiation becomes public in a different quarter. AR is the intercept in the regression of monthly excess returns. The 4-factor model includes Fama and French (1993) This table reexamines results in the Table IV for a different control sample (Stock only). Here, Stock only corresponds to returns for those managers that invest in stock and loan markets, but were not part of the loan renegotiation for a given event. Stock & Loan corresponds to returns for the investors that were part of the loan renegotiation. As in Table IV , reported results correspond to returns realized on trades in stocks of companies with loan renegotiations (each number is AR x Trade Direction, averaged across loan renegotiations). Returns are annualized and are measured over one month following loan renegotiation. The difference between Panel A and B is the definition of Trade direction. In Panel A, Trade direction is equal to -1, 0, or 1 if, over the past quarter, the investor reduced, did not change, or increased his position in a given stock (i.e., the returns are counted only if the stock was traded). In Panel B, Trade direction is equal to -1 if, over the past quarter, the investor reduced his position in a given stock and, otherwise, it is equal to 1. To account for quarterly reporting of institutional stock holdings, the last four columns report results for the sub-sample restricted to those cases where the information about renegotiation becomes public in a different quarter. AR is the intercept in the regression of monthly excess returns. The 4-factor model includes Fama and French (1993) factors and the Cahart (1997) momentum factor. t-statistics are shown in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
TABLE VI ABNORMAL RETURNS FOLLOWING LOAN RENEGOTIATIONS: INVESTORS WITH ACCESS TO LOAN RENEGOTIATIONS, ALL STOCKS
This table shows returns realized by the investors that were part of the loan renegotiation on trades in stocks of the companies with loan renegotiations, and compares it to the rest of their stock portfolio. Each number is AR x Trade Direction averaged across loan renegotiations. Returns are annualized and are measured over one month following loan renegotiation. The difference between Panel A and B is the definition of Trade direction. In Panel A, Trade direction is equal to -1, 0, or 1 if, over the past quarter, the investor reduced, did not change, or increased his position in a given stock (i.e., the returns are counted only if the stock was traded). In Panel B, Trade direction is equal to -1 if, over the past quarter, the investor reduced his position in a given stock and, otherwise, it is equal to 1. AR is the intercept in the regression of monthly excess returns. The 4-factor model includes Fama and French (1993) This table reexamines results in the Table VI for a different control sample. This table shows returns realized by the investors that were part of the loan renegotiation on trades in stocks of the companies with loan renegotiations, and compares it to their trades in other stocks with loans outstanding. Each number is AR x Trade Direction averaged across loan renegotiations. Returns are annualized and are measured over one month following loan renegotiation. The difference between Panel A and B is the definition of Trade direction. In Panel A, Trade direction is equal to -1, 0, or 1 if, over the past quarter, the investor reduced, did not change, or increased his position in a given stock (i.e., the returns are counted only if the stock was traded). In Panel B, Trade direction is equal to -1 if, over the past quarter, the investor reduced his position in a given stock and, otherwise, it is equal to 1. AR is the intercept in the regression of monthly excess returns. The 4-factor model includes Fama and French (1993) This table looks at the abnormal returns on the stock trades following loan renegotiations using differences-in-differences framework. The dependent variable is Abnormal Return (AR) x Trade direction. Each observation is in the format (AR k,t x TD i,k,t ), where k stands for the stock, t stands for the loan amendment, and i stands for the institutional manager. Each coefficient corresponds to the marginal effect for the indicated group (Investors * Stocks), averaged across loan amendments. The difference between Panel A and B is the definition of Trade direction. In Panel A, Trade direction is equal to -1, 0, or 1 if, over the past quarter, the investor reduced, did not change, or increased his position in a given stock (i.e., the returns are counted only if the stock was traded). In Panel B, Trade direction is equal to -1 if, over the past quarter, the investor reduced his position in a given stock and, otherwise, it is equal to 1. AR is the intercept in the regression of monthly excess returns. The 4-factor model includes Fama and French (1993) This table looks at the abnormal returns on trading in related stocks following loan renegotiation. We define two companies as Related if the absolute value of earnings correlation is in the top quintile (Panel A), if the absolute value of stock returns correlation is in the top quintile (Panel B), or if companies belong to the same 2-digit SIC code (Panel C). The table shows differences between the Stock & Loan investors and for the Stock only investors. Stock & Loan corresponds to returns for the investors that were part of the loan renegotiation and Stock only corresponds to returns for those investors that were not part of the loan renegotiation. We restrict the Stock only group to those investors that invest in the loan markets. Returns are annualized and are measured over one month following loan renegotiation. Each number is AR x Trade Direction, averaged across loan renegotiations. Trade direction is equal to -1, 0, or 1 if, over the past quarter, the investor reduced, did not change, or increased his position in a given stock (i.e., the returns are counted only if the stock was traded). To account for quarterly reporting of institutional stock holdings, the last four columns report results for the sub-sample restricted to those cases where the information about renegotiation becomes public in a different quarter. AR is the intercept in the regression of monthly excess returns. The 4-factor model includes Fama and French (1993) This table shows event time performance for institutional investors who have access to the loan amendment information. The event time is the quarter of the loan amendment. Stocks held by an investor are first sorted into quintiles according to the absolute value of their returns correlation with the stock issued by the loan amendment company. Rank 1 is the lowest absolute correlation, and rank 5 is the highest. Within each correlation quintile, stocks are then sub-sorted into three groups based on signed trading volume by the investor. Rank 1 is the strongest sell, and rank 3 is the strongest buy. Mean return for each subgroup is calculated across all investors for a given period. HML is the average performance difference between strong buy group and strong sell group. The table reports the time-series average of each quantity. ***, ** and * indicate p-values of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
